One Engine. Many Vessels.

The MobilALLY Cryptographic Module is one hardware integrity engine, delivered in the form factor each operational venue demands. The vessel changes; the floor does not.

MCM Chip

The Integrity Engine

Every form factor carries the same patent-pending three-domain architecture: an untrusted host interface, a reconfigurable hardware enforcement layer, and a hardened security module where keys live and die without ever touching software.

Three-Domain Architecture
ML-KEM-1024 / ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 203/204)
PUF-Rooted Identity & Hardware Command Whitelist

MCM microSD

The integrity engine in its smallest fielded form.

PROTOTYPE OPERATIONAL
MCM microSD Visualization

The flagship form factor: a complete three-domain hardware security module in a microSD footprint. Slot it into drones, radios, handhelds, and edge sensors — post-quantum key operations and device identity, fully isolated from the host.

Three-Domain Architecture
ML-KEM-1024 / ML-DSA-87
PUF-Rooted Device Identity
Hardware Command Whitelist

MCM USB-C

Workforce integrity that travels.

IN DEVELOPMENT
MCM USB-C Visualization

Post-quantum authentication, hardware-encrypted storage, and hardware-isolated keys for laptops, workstations, and field kits — the integrity engine in a pocketable USB-C module.

Post-Quantum Authentication
Hardware-Encrypted Storage
Keys Never Touch the Host

MCM Drive Fob

Your vehicle's data, on your terms.

CONCEPT
MCM Drive Fob Visualization

A vehicle-bus security module in a plug-in fob. Inspects phone-to-infotainment traffic, detects anomalous vehicle-bus activity, and strips personal data from outbound telematics — control over what leaves the vehicle, with zero modification to it.

Phone-to-Vehicle Traffic Inspection
Vehicle-Bus Anomaly Detection
PII Redaction at the Source

MCM PCIe / M.2

The floor under your infrastructure.

ROADMAP
MCM PCIe / M.2 Visualization

Server, gateway, and ground-station form factor. Hardware root of trust for racks, SATCOM terminals, and control planes — the same engine, scaled to infrastructure.

Server & Gateway Integration
Hardware Key Custody at Scale
Post-Quantum Attestation

MCM Embedded

Integrity at the point of actuation.

IN DEVELOPMENT
MCM Embedded Visualization

Board-level module for drones, vehicles, robotics, and industrial control. Commands verified and telemetry sealed in silicon — on the platform, before anything moves.

Vehicle-Bus Enforcement
Command Verification in Silicon
Sealed Telemetry at the Source

MCM Ring & Ring-T

Identity you wear. Down to a ring.

CONCEPT
MCM Ring & Ring-T Visualization

Presence-based, post-quantum identity in a ring. MCM Ring secures daily life — devices unlock when you arrive and lock when you walk away. MCM Ring-T hardens the same engine for the field: MIL-STD-810H, 20ATM, −40°C to +85°C.

Presence-Based Authentication
Post-Quantum Signatures
Hardware-Bound Identity
Ring-T: MIL-STD-810H Tactical Variant

The Vulnerability

Software encryption has a critical weakness: Keys live in device memory. A compromised device means compromised keys. Nation-states are already harvesting encrypted traffic for future quantum decryption.

  • Zero-days and forensic tools extract keys from software.
  • Harvest-now, decrypt-later attacks are active today.
  • Post-quantum algorithms offer zero protection if keys are stolen.
Mathematical Reality:
P(key_compromise) = P(host_compromise)

The MCM Solution

Three physically distinct security domains. The host is explicitly untrusted. Keys never leave the secure element.

  • Domain 1 (Host): Untrusted Platform
  • Domain 2 (Hardware Gate): FPGA Protocol Die
  • Domain 3 (HSM): MEC175xB Secure Element
Mathematical Reality:
P(key_compromise) = P(host) × P(hw_gate) × P(HSM) ≈ 10⁻¹⁵
15 orders of magnitude improvement over software-only solutions.

Why We Are Different

Software PQC

(liboqs, wolfSSL)
Implement algorithms
Implements architecture
Keys in host memory
Keys never leave hardware
FIPS 140-3 Level 1
Targeting Level 3

Traditional HSMs

(Thales, AWS, YubiHSM)
Rack-mounted / Dongles
SD Card / USB-C / Embedded
Lack post-quantum algos
Native ML-KEM-1024
Passive storage
Active Threat Detection (RF DNA)

Foreign Silicon

(ESP32-based solutions)
DFARS compliance risks
DFARS 252.204-7012 Compliant
Foreign secure elements
US-Designed Microchip MEC175xB
Implicit trust
Host Explicitly Untrusted

MCM Roadmap & Generations

MCM-100 [Consumer]

USB-C form factor, consumer line

MCM-200 [Enterprise]

SD card form factor, data center integration

MCM-300 [Defense]

Tactical hardening, extended temperature range

MCM-300C [Space]

Dirac topological protection, radiation hardened

MCM-400 [Counter-AAI]

RF Signal DNA, Threat Intelligence Module